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848 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
INTRODUCTION
Dewayne Johnson, a 46-year-old school groundskeeper, had used the 
popular weed killer Roundup since 2012.1 Several years after Johnson
began using Roundup, his doctors diagnosed the father of three with
mycosis fungoides, a form of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.2 Johnson sued 
Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup.3 Although doctors told Johnson 
he likely would not live to see the end of the trial, Johnson was in court on 
June 18, 2018, when the jury returned a $289 million verdict in his favor.4 
The outcome of the trial hinged on whether Roundup is carcinogenic to 
humans, and both the plaintiff’s attorney and the defendant’s attorney
presented scientific evidence on the issue.5 Monsanto claims that Johnson
introduced “junk science” meant to “inflame” the jury and plans to appeal 
on the grounds that the judge should have excluded the evidence.6 
Monsanto faces 5,000 similar lawsuits nationwide.7 The outcome of
Monsanto’s appeal in Johnson v. Monsanto Co. and the thousands of cases
pending nationwide will depend on whether the trial judges allow the 
introduction of the plaintiffs’ scientific experts’ testimony. Future 
decisions could cost Monsanto hundreds of millions of dollars.8 
1. Sam Levin & Patrick Greenfield, Monsanto Ordered to Pay $289m as 





4. Johnson v. Monsanto Co., 190, CGC-16-550128, 2018 WL 4409024 
(Cal. Super. Jun. 18, 2018); Note that although California uses a modified version 
of the Frye test, this example still shows that whether scientific evidence is 
admitted is critical for the outcome of trials, which can result in massive damage
awards. Regardless, the Frye test requires judges to make determinations as to
scientific validity, and many of the thousands of suits pending will be in
jurisdictions that follow Daubert.
5. Levin & Greenfield, supra note 1.
6. Tina Bellon, Monsanto Roundup Appeal Has Uphill Climb on ‘Junk 





8. See Johnson, 2018 WL 4409024. 
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Courts and commentators have struggled for decades to articulate
standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence.9 At times, a case
turns on whether the judge admits a particular piece of evidence, as in 
Johnson v. Monsanto Co.10 In Johnson, the trial judge allowed the expert
testimony of oncologist Dr. Nabhan, who testified to the cause of
Johnson’s illness.11 In denying Monsanto’s motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict,12 the court briefly touched on the
admissibility of Dr. Nabhan’s expert testimony regarding his differential
diagnosis.13 Using a differential diagnosis, Dr. Nabhan concluded that
Johnson’s exposure to Roundup was likely a substantial factor in his
developing cancer.14 Dr. Nabhan’s expert testimony was a central issue in 
the case, so it likely influenced the jury’s decision to find Monsanto
liable.15 
Since expert testimony regarding scientific evidence can be pivotal in
a trial, it is important that only scientifically valid evidence enters the
courtroom.16 The task of determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence naturally falls on the trial judge because the admissibility of
evidence is a legal issue rather than a factual one.17 Frequently, the
scientific complexities are beyond the comprehension of our legal
9. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding 
Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901) (discussing the issues that expert
testimony presents).
10. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical
Studies Tell Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 127 
(2005) (stating that judges granted motions for summary judgment far more often
after Daubert, and 90% were against plaintiffs).
11. Johnson v. Monsanto Co., No. CGC-16-550128, 2018 WL 5246323, at
*2 (Cal. Super. Oct. 22, 2018).
12. “Judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A judgment entered for one party
even though a jury verdict has been rendered for the opposing party.” Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13. Johnson, 2018 WL 5246323, at *2. When conducting a differential
diagnosis, a doctor begins by “ruling in” all possible causes of the patient’s
ailment and then rules out all of the possible causes until the doctor is left with
the most likely cause. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
17. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2018); id. 104(a); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (rejecting 
Frye’s general acceptance test as the standard but concluding that the trial judge
must ensure the proffered evidence is reliable).
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850 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
system’s generalist judges.18 Therefore, judges may turn to several 
procedural mechanisms for help with difficult technical and scientific 
questions.19 
This Comment explores judges’ use of court-appointed experts,
informal advisors, and special masters to aid in making evidentiary
decisions that require technical or scientific knowledge. This Comment 
argues that in the context of Daubert hearings, judges should appoint 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 53 (“FRCP 53”) special masters
with greater frequency and that changes should be made either
jurisprudentially or through legislation to allow for their increased use.20 
Part I of this Comment evaluates the former standard for admissibility of
expert testimony in federal courts under Frye21 and the current standard 
under Daubert.22 Additionally, Part I explores some criticisms of Frye and 
Daubert and examines the high degree of scientific sophistication required 
to perform a Daubert analysis. Part II evaluates proposed solutions to the
inherent difficulties that occur when generalist judges make
determinations based on scientific principles in the Daubert hearing
context. Part III of this Comment proposes that special masters are the
ideal procedural tool for judges seeking help with Daubert analyses and
examines lessons from patent law to support that conclusion. Part IV
demonstrates that increased use of special masters will lead to a negligible
increase in cost for litigants and that special masters are less likely to be 
biased than court-appointed experts and informal advisors.
18. John W. Wesley, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial
Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 686 (1984) (stating that “[t]rial judges 
are trained in the law and rarely have a technical background. Accordingly, the
trial judge also may fail to fully comprehend complex scientific evidence.”).
19. FED. R. EVID. 706; FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (2018); Reilly v. United States, 863 
F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1988) (reiterating the inherent authority of courts to
appoint informal advisors).
20. Simply put, special masters are individuals who judges may appoint to 
perform a variety of functions, including pre-trial functions such as Daubert and
Markman hearings.
21. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence is whether the methodology underlying 
the conclusion has been met with general acceptance by the members of the
relevant scientific field).
22. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that
FRE 702 overrules Frye and enshrining the Daubert factors and the judge’s
gatekeeper duty).
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8512020] COMMENT
I. JUDGES’ DIFFICULT ROLES REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY AND 
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
In 1901, Judge Learned Hand wrote, “No one will deny that the law
should in some way use expert knowledge where it will aid in settling 
disputes. The only question is how to do it best.”23 Science has progressed
exponentially since the turn of the 20th century, and modern judges still
face the same problems concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence
that their predecessors did. 
A. The Frye Test
Expert testimony concerns “a scientific, technical, professional, or
other specialized issue given by a person qualified to testify because of
familiarity with the subject or special training in the field.”24 In other 
words, expert testimony concerns topics laypeople generally have trouble
understanding. Parties retain experts to help the fact-finder understand
factual issues “outside the realm of common experience.”25 For example,
an economist may testify about a disabled plaintiff’s future lost wages.26 
Similarly, a doctor may testify that exposure to the defendant’s drug 
caused the plaintiff’s birth defects.27 Before the fact-finder can hear the
expert testimony, the judge must first determine that the testimony is
reliable enough to be admitted into evidence.28 The first universally 
applied test for the admissibility of expert testimony was the Frye test.
Under Frye, the judge performs a two-part analysis.29 First, the judge
identifies the field of the underlying scientific principle or methodology; 
second, the judge determines whether that principle “has been generally
accepted by members of that field.”30 The Frye test assumes that scientists
are best equipped to determine what constitutes valid scientific 
23. Hand, supra note 9, at 40.
24. Expert Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
25. Carol Kelly, Utilizing Experts in Litigation, MOTOR VEHICLE TORTS 
MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 10.2 (2016).
26. Richard v. Artigue, 87 So. 3d 997, 1004 (La. Ct. App. 3rd Cir. 2012)
(discussing two expert witness economists’ differing estimates of future lost 
wages).
27. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.
28. Id. at 589.
29. Jay Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1990 (1996).
30. Id.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  196 8/17/20  7:19 AM








   
 
   
 
   







    
 
   
   
  
 
    
    
      
 
 
     
    
 
   
       
     
    
          
     
    
      
852 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
methodology.31 As such, the scientific community as a whole determines 
admissibility.32 The implicit understanding is that judges are less equipped 
than scientists to assess the validity of scientific methodology because
most judges lack training in a scientific discipline.33 Frye makes the 
judge’s job relatively easy because it does not require any scientific 
analysis of the scientific methodology.34 The judge simply relies on the
parties’ presentations of expert opinions in the relevant field to determine
whether the evidence is admissible.35 Many scholars criticize Frye as an
imprecise standard for admissibility. 
1. Criticisms of Frye
The Frye test suffers from vagueness and malleability. Frye provided
neither guidance on how to determine the breadth of a “relevant scientific 
field,” nor guidance on what constituted “general acceptance.”36 The test’s
inherent vagueness allowed judges to include evidence by contracting the
relevant scientific field to artificially create general acceptance.37 
Conversely, judges wishing to exclude evidence could broaden the scope
of the relevant scientific field to ensure the methodology or principle did 
not obtain general acceptance because of the additional, possibly irrelevant
opinions of scientists who were on the fringes of the broadly defined
relevant field.38 Moreover, judges could define “general acceptance” in a
way that excluded the proffered evidence by requiring a majority or
supermajority of the relevant scientific field to agree with the 
methodology.39 Perhaps the most poignant critique of the Frye standard 
was that it lagged behind scientific advances.40 The general acceptance
31. Michael C. Polentz, Post-Daubert Confusion with Expert Testimony, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1187, 1190 (1996).
32. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The
requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community assures those most
qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the 
determinative voice.”).
33. Kesan, supra note 29, at 1989–91.
34. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Addison, 498 
F.2d at 743–44.
35. Addison, 498 F.2d at 744.
36. Kesan, supra note 29 at 1991; see also Paul C. Gianneli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1197 1209–1213 (1980).
37. Kesan, supra note 29, at 1991; see also Gianneli, supra note 36, at 1209–13.
38. Kesan, supra note 29, at 1991.
39. Id. at 1990.
40. Id.; see also Gianneli, supra note 36, at 1209–13.
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prong prevented nuanced, but scientifically sound, evidence from being 
heard by the jury because the relevant scientific community may not have 
had a chance to fully examine a new technique.41 Despite the Frye test’s
drawbacks, it was the uncontested standard for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence in federal courts from 1923 until the enactment of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in 1975.42 
The FRE governs the presentation of evidence in all actions in federal 
court.43 Congress enacted the FRE in 1975, and the debates leading up to 
its adoption made little mention of Frye.44 Characteristic of the FRE is its
“liberal thrust,”45 which leans toward the admission of evidence.46 The
liberal attitude of the FRE toward evidence was at odds with the stringent 
requirements of Frye.47 Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 (“FRE 702”)
contains the provisions for the admissibility of expert witness testimony.48 
When Congress enacted the FRE, FRE 702 only required that the expert
be qualified.49 The current version of FRE 702 specifically states that the
judge should admit the proffered expert testimony if it passes several
reliability criteria and “will help the trier of fact.”50 The United States 
Supreme Court described the helpfulness standard as the requirement of a 
“fit” between the proffered testimony and fact at issue.51 Commentators
and courts quickly began debating whether Frye survived the enactment
of FRE 702.52 
41. Kesan, supra note 29, at 1990; see also Gianneli, supra note 36, at 1209–13.
42. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579. 587–90 (1993)
(discussing the effect of the FRE on the Frye standard). 
43. FED. R. EVID. 101 (2018).
44. Gianneli, supra note 36, at 2000–01.
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
46. FED R. EVID. 401; id. 702.
47. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; Troy M. Horton, The Debate is Over: Frye
Lives No More, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 379, 380 (1994) (introducing Frye, FRE
702, and Daubert).
48. FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. Id. An expert is considered qualified and can offer expert testimony when
the proffering attorney demonstrates that the expert and the testimony conform to
the admissibility test the court uses. Id.
50. Id.
51. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (“Rule 702’s helpfulness standard requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility.”).
52. Compare United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)
(rejecting Frye and using a reliability test, noting that “[a] determination of
reliability cannot rest solely on a process of ‘counting (scientific) noses’”), with
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  198 8/17/20  7:19 AM




   
  
  
   
 
 
    





   
   







   
 
    
   




   
    
   
    
   
   
  
   
   
  
854 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. The Daubert Test
The United States Supreme Court answered that question with a
resounding “no” in 1993 when it held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., that FRE 702 superseded Frye.53 The plaintiffs in 
Daubert alleged that Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug manufactured by 
Merrell Dow, caused serious birth defects in their infant children.54 The 
trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s expert testimony55 did not meet the Frye
test and excluded the evidence, granting summary judgment to the 
defendants.56 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.57 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the proper
admissibility criteria for expert testimony.58 After announcing that FRE
702 superseded Frye, the Court stated that FRE 702 did not allow all 
purportedly expert testimony and offered several non-exhaustive factors
that judges could use to determine when expert testimony is reliable and
thus admissible.59 The Court established that a trial judge applying FRE 
702 should act as a “gatekeeper” when determining whether evidence is
admissible.60 
The determination of whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable
to be considered scientific knowledge, and thus admissible, focuses on the
principles and methodology that the expert used to reach her conclusions,
leaving the actual conclusions drawn from the scientific evidence for the
Federal Rules of Evidence, combined with Frye . . . provide a framework for trial 
judges struggling with proffered expert testimony.”).
53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (finding Frye’s general acceptance test “would 
be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules.”).
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
55. These experts’ conclusions rested on the following: (1) evidence garnered 
from animal tests that tended to show a link between Bendectin and malformations; 
(2) pharmacological studies of Bendectin’s chemical structure that tended to show
similarities between Bendectin’s chemical structure and those of other drugs that 
caused birth defects; and (3) reanalysis of previously published statistics based on 
human studies. Id. at 583.
56. Id. at 583–85.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 585. 
59. Id. at 589–95. Although the list is non-exhaustive, and some courts—for 
example, the Ninth Circuit—have added a factor, for the sake of simplicity this
Comment focuses on the factors enumerated in Daubert.
60. Id. at 592–93 (“The trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to 
Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.”).
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  199 8/17/20  7:19 AM




   









   
  
   
    





   




   
  
 
   
   
 
 
     
     
   
   
       
  
      
       
  
       
8552020] COMMENT
jury to analyze.61 The Court stated that the “gatekeeper” function has two 
prongs: reliability and relevance, which together create the Daubert 
admissibility analysis.62 First, the judge must determine whether the expert
proposes to testify to “scientific knowledge.”63 This first prong of the
Daubert admissibility analysis depends on application of the Daubert
factors.64 The non-exhaustive list of factors the Court provided includes: 
(1) whether an expert could test or has tested the theory or technique; (2) 
whether experts in the field have peer-reviewed or published the theory or
technique; (3) whether there is a well-known or potential rate of error and
whether standards are in place that control the technique’s operation; and
(4) whether the relevant scientific community generally accepts the theory
or technique.65 Even if the reliability prong is satisfied, the proffered
testimony must still pass the relevancy prong. Relevant expert testimony 
assists the fact-finder in understanding or determining a factual issue, as 
measured by the “helpfulness” or “fit” standard.66 Although Daubert held 
that FRE 702 superseded Frye, the Court imported the Frye standard into
the Daubert factors via the general acceptance factor.67 The transition from
Frye to Daubert was a massive shift in determining expert testimony 
admissibility.
Courts and commentators quickly began evaluating the Daubert
standard.68 Some contended that Daubert made up for Frye’s 
shortcomings regarding the vagueness of what constitutes general
acceptance and the relevant scientific field.69 Daubert was supposed to be
a more flexible standard than Frye, by which judges could admit novel
scientific evidence that may not pass Frye’s general acceptance factor
because of the time lapse between a new discovery and its general
61. Manuel L. Real, Daubert—A Judge’s View—A Reprise, SK042 A.L.I.– 
A.B.A. 447, 457 (2004) (discussing the proper method of performing the Daubert 
analysis).
62. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590–92. 
63. Id. (“The adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science. Similarly, the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”).
64. Id. at 592–96.
65. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
66. Id.
67. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
68. See generally, Kesan, supra note 29; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
69. People v. Schreck, 22 P.3d 68, 76 (2001) (citing scholarly work critical
of the vagueness of the Frye test); Robert J. Goodwin, Fifty Years of Frye in
Alabama: The Continuing Debate over Adopting the Test Established in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 35 CUMB. L. REV. 232, 282–88 (2005).
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856 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
acceptance.70 Additionally, some courts suggested that Daubert gives
judges more authority to determine the admissibility of evidence because
the decision diminished the authority of the scientific community by
making the general acceptance factor one of several instead of
determinative.71 
Following Daubert, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two other
cases that, together with Daubert, comprise “The Daubert Trilogy.”72 The 
second case in the trilogy was General Electric Co. v. Joiner.73 In Joiner, 
the plaintiff alleged that his work as an electrician on transformers that
General Electric manufactured exposed him to polychlorated biphenyls
(“PCBs”),74 which caused him to develop small cell lung cancer.75 The 
plaintiff attempted to introduce expert testimony based on studies 
indicating that mice developed cancer after exposure to massive doses of
PCBs.76 The trial court, applying Daubert, ruled the evidence inadmissible
on the basis that it was not relevant to proving whether the PCBs had more
likely than not promoted the plaintiff’s lung cancer—meaning that the 
“fit” between studies on mice and applicability to humans was not close
70. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (“Thus, while the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range 
of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye, they leave in 
place the ‘gatekeeper’ role of the trial judge in screening such evidence.”). But 
see Christina L. Studebaker et. al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices,
and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 330 (suggesting judges apply stricter scrutiny to expert
testimony under Daubert than they had under Frye).
71. Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329–330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(suggesting that the general acceptance standard amounted to judicial abdication).
72. McClain v Metabolife Intern., Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1249 (11th Cir. 2005)
(referencing the Daubert Trilogy).
73. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (holding that appellate
courts must apply abuse of discretion review to Daubert determinations). The
final case in the Daubert Trilogy, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137 (1999), applies Daubert to not just scientific expert testimony, but expert 
testimony in general.
74. Polychlorinated Biphenyls, or PCBs, are widely considered dangerous to
human health. Congress banned most production of PCBs in 1978. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(e)(2)(A).
75. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139–41.
76. Id. at 144. The plaintiff’s proffered experts based this opinion on studies
conducted on infant mice, wherein the researchers injected infant mice with high 
doses of PCBs to see if they developed cancer. Of course, the infant mice
developed cancer; however, they developed alveologenic adenomas, whereas the
plaintiff developed small cell carcinomas. Id.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  201 8/17/20  7:19 AM





















   
 
 
    
  
   
 
      
 
    
  
  
     
 
   
     
   
    
    
    
     
  
     
    
    
8572020] COMMENT
enough.77 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the testimony was
admissible after conducting a de novo review of the trial court’s Daubert
analysis.78 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that
the proper standard of review for Daubert analyses was abuse of 
discretion, not de novo.79 
Justice Breyer concurred in the result and wrote separately to
emphasize the importance of getting the Daubert analysis right.80 He noted
it is “essential,” particularly in toxic tort litigation, that the judge
determining the admissibility of proffered scientific evidence make the 
correct determination.81 Furthermore, he argued that judges should seek 
the assistance of scientists when performing the gatekeeping function.82 
Justice Breyer explicitly advocated the use of special masters and court-
appointed experts in Daubert hearings to help judges handle difficult 
admissibility determinations requiring technical or scientific expertise.83 
Moreover, he noted: “Given this kind of cooperative effort, from the
scientific to the legal community, and given the various Rules-authorized 
methods for facilitating the court’s task, it seems to me that Daubert’s
gatekeeping requirement will not prove inordinately difficult to
implement.”84 Conversely, without “cooperative effort” between the
scientific and legal communities, Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement
could prove difficult to implement, which is exactly what has occurred.85 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence harkens back to the majority opinion in 
Daubert in that both recognize the need for scientific expertise in making
scientific evidentiary determinations.86 Both opinions premise correct
Daubert determinations on assistance from the scientific community.87 
77. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F.Supp. 1310, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d,
78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir.1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Recall that Daubert
requires the proffered testimony to be scientific and helpful to the trier of fact.
The testimony in Joiner failed the latter prong. This Comment focuses on
alternative methods of determining the first prong. 
78. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).
79. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146–47.
80. Id. at 148–50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 148–50.
82. Id. at 149–50.
83. Id. at 149.
84. Id. at 150.
85. See generally Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
87. Id.; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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858 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
1. Criticisms of Daubert
Joiner established that appellate courts apply de novo review to
Daubert analyses, but this application has exacerbated some of the
problems with the doctrine. Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and
dissented in part with the Daubert majority.88 He agreed that FRE 702 
superseded Frye but questioned the new role judges would assume.89 
Specifically, he lamented that judges would have to take on the role of
“amateur scientists” to apply the Daubert factors and implied that this role 
may be difficult because judges are not usually trained in scientific
disciplines.90 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Daubert, was
cognizant of Justice Rehnquist’s concerns, as he wrote that judges “should 
also be mindful of other applicable rules,” citing Federal Rules of
Evidence Rule 706 (“FRE 706”) regarding court-appointed experts as a 
means by which judges could better assess scientific methodology.91 
Daubert suffers from several problems that all stem from the technical
and scientific competency required to correctly apply the Daubert factors.
First, Daubert requires judges to make assessments about scientific
methodology using the Daubert factors, even though most judges are ill-
equipped to make these assessments because judges are usually not trained 
in scientific disciplines.92 When Daubert returned to the Ninth Circuit on
remand, the heading of the opinion in which the judge discussed the new
Daubert requirements was titled “A Brave New World.”93 The judge
described the task as “daunting” and “complex” and asserted that it puts
judges in an “uncomfortable” position.94 Specifically, the judge lamented
that trial judges must now make determinations as to the methodologies of
scientists “though we are largely untrained in science and certainly no 
match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing.”95 The
Ninth Circuit had strong doubts as to the judiciary’s ability to apply 
Daubert.
Daubert’s second problem emerged from the findings of a study by 
Dr. Sophia Gatowski, who found that judges have difficulty applying the 
88. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 601.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 595.
92. David Faigman, Judges as Amateur Scientists Symposium: The Role of 
the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1209–11 (2006).
93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1316.
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8592020] COMMENT
factors.96 Gatowski surveyed 400 judges’ understandings of the Daubert
factors.97 Of the surveyed judges, only 6% could articulate a scientific 
meaning of falsifiability, and 35% clearly indicated that they did not
understand the scientific meaning of falsifiability.98 The researchers also 
concluded that only 4% of the surveyed judges could articulate a scientific
understanding of how to apply the concept of error rate, and 86% of
responses indicated the judges’ understandings were “questionable at
best.”99 The judges fared far better in their understandings of the factors of 
peer review, publication, and general acceptance, with over 70% 
exhibiting a scientific understanding of the concepts.100 
Daubert’s third problem came to light when the researchers asked the
judges what the Supreme Court intended to accomplish.101 Of the judges
who responded, 32% said the intent was to raise the threshold for
admissibility of scientific evidence; 23% said the intent was to lower the
threshold for the admissibility of scientific evidence; 36% said the intent 
was neither to raise nor lower the threshold for admissibility, but rather to
articulate a framework for admissibility and to give judges the discretion
to apply the guidelines as appropriate; and the remaining 11% were
unsure.102 The study shows that judges may be confused as to what
96. Gatowski et al., supra note 85, at 433.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 444–45.
The susceptibility of a hypothesis, theory, view, etc. to being proved 
false. Using the scientific method, one seeks to establish a hypothesis
that fits all or most of the known facts and then proceeds to attack that 
hypothesis at its weakest points by extracting from it predictions that can 
be shown to be false. The Supreme Court has endorsed falsifiability as 
important for courts in determining whether evidence is scientifically
reliable. 
Falsifiability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
99. Gatowski et al., supra note 85, at 444–45.
100. Id. at 447–48.
101. Id. at 443.
102. Id. The percentages provided are rounded for the sake of clarity. In 
fairness, this is not a simple question. If Daubert replaced Frye because “a rigid 
‘general acceptance’ requirement [is] at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the
Federal Rules . . .” as the Supreme Court said, then it stands to reason that Daubert
enshrined a more liberal standard. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 
573, 588 (1993). However, studies have suggested that judges exclude more 
evidence under Daubert than they had under Frye. Vickers, supra note 10, at 126– 
32 (discussing studies by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice and the Federal
Judicial Study that together confirm that judges are excluding more evidence
under Daubert than they had under Frye).
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860 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Daubert was meant to accomplish, which translates into increased
difficulty in application.
Although it is difficult to quantify how often judges misapply Daubert, 
Gatowski’s study suggests that judges may often misapply the Daubert
factors, which could lead to incorrect results and the exclusion of “good”
evidence or inclusion of “bad” evidence.103 The difficulties that judges
experience when applying Daubert are particularly troublesome because of
juries’ tendencies to place undue reliance on expert testimony simply
because it is expert testimony.104 Since juries rely heavily on expert 
testimony, improperly admitted testimony or the lack of improperly
excluded testimony could influence the outcome of a trial, which highlights
the importance of ensuring accurate admissibility determinations.105 
Criticisms of judges’ abilities to grasp difficult scientific concepts 
predate the Daubert era. Although judges may be better equipped than the 
average juror to make determinations requiring scientific knowledge,
judges rarely have a technical background.106 One pre-Daubert jurist
commented that “substantive” review of “mathematical and scientific
evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously unreliable.”107 The
same judge concurred in another case because he said he lacked the
technical expertise to make an informed decision.108 The difficulties
inherent in generalist judges making determinations as to the admissibility 
of scientific evidence existed before Daubert and still continue.
According to a 2000 study by the Federal Judicial Center,109 Daubert
failed to fix other problems with expert testimony, including lack of
103. Gatowski et al., supra note 85, at 443.
104. Kayla Mannucci, Note, Framed by Forensics: Fulfilling Daubert’s
Gatekeeping Function by Segregating Science from the Adversarial Model, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1976 (2018) (“[J]urors are inclined to attach significant
value to scientific testimony.”).
105. Id.
106. Wesley, supra note 18, at 685.
107. Ethyl Corp. v. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring).
108. Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (“I recognize that I do not know enough about 
dynamometer extrapolations, deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to
decide whether or not the government’s approach to these matters was statistically
valid. . . . I do not have the technical know-how to agree or disagree with [the
court’s] evaluation.”).
109. According to its website, the Federal Judicial Center is “the research and
education agency of the judicial branch of the United States government.” FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/TG55-PVVP] (last accessed 
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8612020] COMMENT
objectivity in expert opinions, experts acting more as advocates than
neutral third parties, and high costs of litigation.110 The same study asked 
judges to rank, on a scale from one to five, with one being “very
infrequent” and five being “very frequent,” several other aspects of post-
Daubert expert testimony.111 Of the federal judges surveyed, the mean 
rank of “expert testimony not comprehensible to the trier of fact” was a
2.49.112 This ranking illustrates the potential for lack of comprehension of
the proffered evidence, which could cause the evidence to be
misevaluated. The mean rank of “expert testimony appears to be of 
questionable validity or reliability” was 2.86.113 This ranking indicates that
judges often question the reliability of the proffered evidence. The Federal 
Judicial Center study shows that Daubert did not fix the main problems 
with expert testimony, and issues with expert testimony requiring Daubert
hearings arise relatively frequently.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING TECHNICAL 
AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES
Commentators and courts have proposed using several procedural
mechanisms to help judges understand technically or scientifically
complex testimony.114 The proposed solutions are court-appointed experts,
informal advisors, and special masters. Judges have used court-appointed 
experts and informal advisors sparingly, while special masters are used 
extensively, but almost exclusively, in patent litigation. 
A. Court-Appointed Experts
Both Justice Blackmun writing for the majority in Daubert and Justice
Breyer concurring in Joiner advocated the use of court-appointed experts 
to engage with the scientific community in Daubert hearings.115 Judges
Jan. 10, 2019, 4:15 PM); Carol L. Krafka, Joe S. Cecil & Mary T. Johnson, Expert 





114. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Bert Black et. al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A 
New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 794–97 (1994)
(suggesting court-appointed experts, informal advisors, and special masters are
all viable options for helping judges with Daubert analyses).
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); Joiner,
522 U.S. at 149 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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862 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
appoint court-appointed experts pursuant to FRE 706.116 Either the parties,
or the court on its own motion, may move for selection of a court-
appointed expert.117 This expert must advise the parties of her findings,118 
and the court or any party may call the expert to testify.119 All parties may 
depose or cross-examine the expert,120 and parties may still proffer their 
own experts.121 Utilizing court-appointed experts is an established method 
of engaging the scientific community.
Scholars and the Supreme Court have advocated the increased use of
court-appointed experts to help with decisions requiring scientific or 
technical knowledge in the context of Daubert hearings.122 First, advocates
point out that the FRE contemplates the use of court-appointed experts.123 
Second, proponents of using court-appointed experts in Daubert hearings 
claim that court-appointed experts can help diminish the battle-of-the-
experts problem.124 Relatedly, court-appointed experts may help diminish 
the prevalence of “hired guns” who align their testimony to support the
party paying for them.125 In fact, the Advisory Committee specifically 






122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); General
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 52 U.S. 136, 150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); See Sofia
Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, The Independent Expert Evolution: From the “Path of 
Least Resistance” to the “Road Less Traveled?,” 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 843 (2003).
123. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; Joiner, 52 U.S. at 150 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. The battle-of-the-experts problem occurs when two experts come to 
opposite conclusions in their testimonies. The fact-finder is left having to
determine which is right when both sides have presented “impressive, articulate, 
highly-credentialed witness.” Thomas Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We 
Really Have “Neutral” Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
927, 947 (1998).
125. A constant criticism of expert testimony in general is that the experts,
because they are hired by the parties, become merely “hired guns” whose 
monetary dependency on the party that hired them induces them to be extremely
biased in favor of the evidence their party wants them to present. See, e.g.,
Crowley, supra note 124, at 947; Eric G. Jensen, When “Hired Guns” Backfire: 
The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L.
REV. 185 (1993); Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming 
“Hired Guns,” 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497 (1996); Lora M. Levett & Margaret 
Bull Kovera, Psychological Mediators of the Effects of Opposing Expert
Testimony on Jury Decisions, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 124 (2009); 
Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2010). 
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8632020] COMMENT
stated in its comments to FRE 706 that the Rule could be used to diminish
the malevolent effects of dueling experts.126 With the court-appointed 
expert’s neutrality, the judge and jury will be able to focus on the scientific
problems rather than issues like witness credibility, which will help them 
better understand the substantive issues.127 
Court-appointed experts have several limitations. First, the Advisory
Committee notes contemplate court-appointed experts as a deterrent to
parties proffering unscrupulous experts rather than frequent participants in
trials.128 Second, if court-appointed experts diminish the battle-of-the-
experts problem, then their opinions must receive some degree of
preferential treatment from the fact-finder that could, and does, lend
experts an “aura of infallibility.”129 Instead of solving the battle-of-the-
experts problem, the addition of another expert may only exacerbate it.130 
Most importantly, every benefit of court-appointed experts rests on the 
presumption that the experts will be neutral. Commentators have pointed 
out that the notion of the perfectly neutral expert is flawed and
unattainable.131 Experience shows that juries are likely to agree with the
court-appointed expert.132 If the expert is not neutral, then she could easily 
project her biases into the court room. Additionally, because any party may 
depose, cross-examine, and call court-appointed experts to testify,133 fierce
fights could erupt over the neutrality of the expert. Moreover, because of
the court-appointed expert’s accessibility to any party, the expert may
complicate an already complex trial, which would increase cost for 
everyone involved. Despite court-appointed experts’ drawbacks, increased
use of court-appointed experts would likely still be better than the current 
state of affairs in Daubert hearings because the expert could increase the
judge’s comprehension of scientific and technical issues.
126. FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee’s note.
127. Id.
128. FED. R. EVID. 702. The Advisory Committee’s note states, “While
experience indicates that actual appointment is a relatively infrequent occurrence,
the assumption may be made that the availability of the procedure in itself
decreases the need for resorting to it.” Id.
129. Id; Robertson, supra note 125, at 198.
130. Mannucci, supra note 104, at 1979.
131. See Crowley, supra note 124, at 947 (stating that science is not “value
neutral” and that experts necessarily cannot be neutral because they have
subscribed to scientific theories and courses of study to obtain the level of
knowledge requisite to qualify as an expert”).
132. Karen Reisinger, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two
Models, 32 IND. L. REV. 225, 237 (1999).
133. FED. R. EVID. 706.
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864 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. Informal Advisors
Informal advisors could also help judges with Daubert analyses. In 
1920 in Ex parte Peterson, the Supreme Court recognized judges’ inherent 
authority to appoint informal advisors.134 In Peterson, the trial judge had 
tasked an informal advisor with narrowing the objects of the dispute to
ease the strain on the jury and judge’s time.135 The informal advisor was
not allowed to make final determinations, and the appeal turned on 
whether use of the informal advisor infringed the parties’ Seventh 
Amendment right to trial by jury.136 The Supreme Court concluded that, in 
the absence of contrary legislation, judges retain the power to appoint an
informal advisor pursuant to the court’s inherent authority.137 The limits
of an informal advisor’s authority were not fully delineated for many
years.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided 
Reilly v. United States in 1988, and Reilly has become the leading case on
the jurisprudential limits of informal advisors.138 In Reilly, the First Circuit
distinguished informal advisors from court-appointed experts139 and
concluded that FRE 706 does not apply to informal advisors.140 By ruling
that informal advisors fall outside the purview of FRE 706, the court freed 
informal advisors from the Rule’s constraints. As such, parties can neither 
depose nor cross-examine an informal advisor.141 
Reilly imposed several limits on informal advisors. The informal
advisor is restricted to acting as a “sounding board” for the judge to help 
134. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (“Courts have (at least in the
absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with 
appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.”).
135. Id. at 306–-7.
136. Id. at 307.
137. Id. at 312–13.
138. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that
informal advisors are not bound by FRE 706).
139. Id. at 155–56.
140. Id. The First Circuit in Reilly is one of the few courts to comment
extensively on the role of informal advisors and to attempt to delineate their 
Article III confines. For the purposes of this Comment, the First Circuit
interpretation will be considered as the standard because it is, to the author’s
knowledge, the only standard. Robert L. Hess II, Judges Cooperating with
Scientists: A Proposal for More Effective Limits on the Federal Trial Judge’s 
Inherent Power to Appoint Technical Advisors, 54 VAND. L. REV. 547, 582–83 
(2001) (stating that beyond the First Circuit, the only limit on inherent advisors’
powers is Article III).
141. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158.
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8652020] COMMENT
her understand difficult scientific or technical issues.142 Because informal
advisors are not judges, courts may not abdicate judicial responsibility to 
them.143 Moreover, because informal advisors are not witnesses, they may 
not contribute evidence, and therefore informal advisors cannot testify.144 
Thus, although informal advisors are free from the rigors of deposition and
cross-examination, informal advisors are also limited in the functions they
can serve.
Proponents of the increased use of informal advisors to promote 
scientific analyses of expert testimony offer several benefits. An informal
advisor may help the judge understand the case’s scientific issues by
deciphering competing experts’ opinions.145 Additionally, some
commentators have suggested that scientists may be wary of testifying 
because of the nature of the adversarial process.146 The informal advisor’s
role is more insulated from the adversarial process because she does not
fall under FRE 706, so “real” scientists may be more apt to participate, as
opposed to purported scientists peddling junk science.147 
Informal advisors avoid many of the downsides of court-appointed 
experts. There is no “aura of infallibility” problem because the jury does
not rely on the informal advisor’s opinions directly, and informal advisors 
do not contribute evidence. Similarly, there is no possibility that the
informal advisor could exacerbate the battle-of-the-experts problem 
because informal advisors are not testifying experts.148 Finally, an 
informal advisor’s inclusion in the trial does not further complicate the
proceedings because she is not as visually involved as court-appointed 
experts.
There are several problems, however, with informal advisors, including 
jurisprudential restrictions, overall lack of transparency, and lack of
accountability. First, the Reilly court limited the use of informal advisors to
extraordinary circumstances, describing times when appointment would be
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 159.
145. Hess, supra note 140, at 562.
146. Samuel Jackson, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court
Appointed Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the Federal
Judicial Center Agree?, 28 ENVTL. L. 431, 453 (1998) (arguing that scientists are 
wary of the adversarial process because it differs from the scientific method, so 
some may avoid participating in the legal system).
147. Id.
148. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 156; Robertson, supra note 125, at 198.
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866 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
necessary as “hen’s-teeth rare.”149 Second, appointment of an informal
advisor is a departure from the adversarial system because parties are not
allowed to cross-examine the advisor, whereas parties can cross-examine a 
court-appointed expert.150 If the informal advisor possessed any biases or
was not entirely neutral, the negative effects of her lack of neutrality would
be far greater than the same problems with court-appointed experts because
of the largely insulated nature of the independent advisor. The lack of cross-
examination also means that only the judge reviews the advisor’s opinions,
and ex parte consultations between the judge and advisor need not be
disclosed to the parties.151 
The lack of transparency inherent in the informal advisor’s role may
be worrisome for parties;152 expert biases could dramatically affect the
course of litigation because informal advisors’ opinions are not checked
by the opinions of other experts. Legislation does not govern the
appointment of informal advisors, which means that only Article III of the
United States Constitution and jurisprudence restrain the possible extent 
of an informal advisor’s authority.153 Finally, the remedy for improper
influence or improper appointment of an informal advisor seems to be
appeal of the appointment, which, if reversed, would likely necessitate a 
new trial with a different judge, thereby rendering the original appointment
a complete waste of judicial and party resources.154 In short, the efficacy 
of informal advisors as a solution suffers from a lack of transparency and 
an overall lack of rules governing their conduct.
C. Special Masters
Special masters are fundamentally different than informal advisors and
court-appointed experts. Special masters exercise a quasi-judicial function
because they make rulings and submit “reports and recommendations” to
the referring judge.155 Special masters do not offer testimony like court-
149. Id. at 157. This restriction is not insurmountable and would only require 
courts to loosen the restrictions on informal advisors. 
150. See generally, Hess, supra note 140, at 585–86; FED. R. EVID. 706(b)(4).
151. Hess, supra note 140, at 558.
152. If informal advisors were used more often, parties would appeal
subsequent decisions based on a lack of transparency. For informal advisors to be 
used more often and still be efficient, there would have to be disclosure to the 
parties as to what the advisor and judge discuss. This would not be difficult 
because the judge could simply order it. 
153. Hess, supra note 140, at 582–88.
154. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988).
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
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8672020] COMMENT
appointed experts.156 A helpful comparison is that special masters are
similar to magistrate judges who perform only the duties assigned by the
referring judge and who are not judges themselves.157 
FRCP 53 broadly allows for the appointment of a special master when
one of the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the parties consent;158 
(2) a district judge or magistrate judge cannot effectively and timely
address pretrial and post-trial matters;159 or (3) when there is an
exceptional condition, a difficult computation of damages, or the need to
perform an accounting during a bench trial.160 The judge’s appointing 
order prescribes the limits of a special master’s authority, which may be 
quite broad.161 The judge reviews both the special master’s conclusions of
law and any findings of fact to which a party objects de novo.162 Together
with court-appointed experts and informal advisors, special masters are
one of the three procedural mechanisms judges may turn to for help.
Unlike informal advisors and court-appointed experts, special masters 
are uniquely suited for the task of deciphering difficult technical and
scientific questions.163 Special masters have performed a variety of
litigation functions on behalf of the referring judge.164 In fact, Congress
heavily amended FRCP 53 in 2003 to incorporate changing practices in
using special masters.165 The amendments “confirmed the authority to 
appoint” special masters for pretrial matters, which include Daubert
hearings.166 
If a judge appoints a special master to preside over a hearing, the 




159. Id. 53(c). 
160. Id. 53(b)(i)–(ii).
161. Id. 53(c).
162. Id. 53(f)(3), (4). Because the admissibility of evidence is a legal
conclusion, any decision by a special master regarding admissibility would be
reviewed de novo. 
163. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[J]udges have increasingly found in the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure
ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty of making determinations about
complicated scientific, or otherwise technical, evidence. Among these techniques
are . . . the appointment of special masters.”); Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with
Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927, 969 (1994).
164. Farrell, supra note 163, at 969.
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 53 Advisory Committee’s note.
166. Id.
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868 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
report and recommendation to the judge.167 The judge usually will accept
the report and recommendation of the special master, but the parties have 
an opportunity to object to the special master’s factual and legal
conclusions.168 This preserves judicial autonomy and allows the judge and
parties to check the special master’s conclusions.
III. SPECIAL MASTERS ARE THE BEST WAY TO INCREASE THE 
ACCURACY OF ADMISSIBILITY DETERMINATIONS IN DAUBERT HEARINGS
Special masters are the ideal way to increase the accuracy of Daubert
determinations. Special masters may be used to resolve the reliability
prong of the Daubert analysis for which a scientist–special master is
particularly suited given her experience in a particular field. This
bifurcation of the Daubert analysis would increase judicial efficiency
without creating a large financial strain on the parties, while also helping 
a case arrive at a just result by keeping unreliable science out of the
courtroom.
A. Current Use of Special Masters
Judges can appoint special masters under limited circumstances.
Currently, judges cannot appoint a special master unless the parties
consent;169 there is an exceptional circumstance;170 or a statute provides
for the appointment.171 First, asking the parties to consent may be difficult
because the parties will have to bear the cost of the special master.172 
Although one party may consent, believing her expert will pass muster and
the adverse party’s expert will not, the adverse party is unlikely to agree 
to the added expense if she does not believe the appointment will be in the
her favor. Because of the possibility that one or both parties will not
consent, relying on the consent of the parties is not the most effective way 
to increase special master appointment.
The second route to special master appointment is an exceptional






172. Id. 53(g)(2)(A). FRCP 53(g)(2)(A) states that the special master can also 
be paid “from a fund or subject matter of the action within the court's control.” 
For simplicity’s sake, only the option of having the parties pay will be considered.
173. Id. 53(a)(1)(B)(i).
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8692020] COMMENT
brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 does not constitute exceptional
circumstances sufficient for the special master to preside over the whole 
trial on the merits.174 In the same case, however, the court held that the 
special master could conduct and supervise pretrial matters and hear 
motions for summary judgment.175 Similarly, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected a request for a writ 
of mandamus directing the district judge to revoke the appointment of a
special master when the appointing order charged the special master “with
selecting a ‘representative sample’ of the withheld documents and with 
summarizing the arguments for and against each claimed exemption.”176 
The jurisprudence tends to show that the extent of allowable delegation of 
authority to the special master is directly related to the “exceptional-ness”
of the issue, meaning the more exceptional the issue, the more authority 
the court can divest to the special master and vice versa.
Unfortunately, there are relatively few reported examples of special 
masters conducting a Daubert analysis under the exceptional
circumstances provision. The lack of special masters conducting Daubert
analyses suggests that judges believe Daubert hearings implicating
complex scientific issues do not constitute the type of exceptional 
circumstance required. Regardless, judges should appoint special masters
for Daubert hearings and appellate courts should uphold these
appointments because the narrow evidentiary issues dealt with in Daubert
hearings are only a small part of trial and, in theory, not dispositive, but
the scientific and technical issues presented can be exceptionally 
difficult.177 Barring increased appointments through the exceptional
circumstances provision, the only remaining option to increase special 
master use in Daubert hearings is through statutory authorization.178 
Although evidence reform is likely not high on current congressional 
agendas, many states’ codes of civil procedure mirror the federal code.179 
174. In re Armco, Inc., 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601– 
9628 (2018).
175. In re Armco, 770 F.2d 103.
176. In re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 848 F.2d 232, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
177. See Gatowski et al., supra note 85.
178. FED. R. CIV. P. (a)(1).
179. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 53. Louisiana’s special master
statute, LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4165 (2019), provides: 
Pursuant to the inherent judicial power of the court and upon its own
motion and with the consent of all parties litigant, the court may enter an 
order appointing a special master in any civil action wherein complicated 
legal or factual issues are presented or wherein exceptional
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870 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Any “state . . . may serve as a laboratory”180 by enacting legislation that
explicitly allows special masters to preside over Daubert hearings.
The statute would be relatively simple:
Trial judges may, at their discretion, appoint a special master to
preside over the reliability prong of Daubert hearings and issue a
report and recommendation as to the admissibility of a party’s
proffered expert’s testimony. In the event a judge elects to appoint 
a special master, the remaining portions of Rule 53 will apply in 
full.
Statutory authorization would allow courts to experiment with special
master use, and Congress could take note if it worked. The statutory 
language allows special master appointment only for a very narrow part of
the trial: the reliability prong of Daubert. Moreover, statutory
authorization has the added benefit that parties will not be able to
challenge the appointment of a special master as not falling under one of
FRCP 53’s categories. 
B. How Appointment of a Special Master Should Work
Under FRCP 53(c), the judge can circumscribe the special master’s
authority, and there are benefits to doing so.181 First, limiting the special
master’s authority would reduce costs because the special master would
do less work than if the special master did the relevance inquiry as well.
Second, accepting that most judges are not scientists and that most
scientists are not legal experts, legal determinations, such as relevance,
belong in the hands of the judge. The scientist–special master should make 
recommendations on the reliability prong alone because it is almost
entirely a scientific question,182 while the judge should make the decision 
as to relevance prong of the Daubert analysis, which is almost entirely a
legal question.183 Third, bifurcating the Daubert inquiry will increase
circumstances of the case warrant such appointment.” The statute could 
be similarly amended to provide for the appointment of a special master
to preside over the reliability prong of a Daubert hearing.  
180. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386–87 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
183. FED. R. EVID. 401; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
598 (1993) (characterizing the admissibility of scientific evidence as “the ultimate
legal question [which] depends on an appreciation of one or more bodies of 
knowledge not judicially noticeable.”).
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8712020] COMMENT
judicial efficiency because the judge will simply have fewer things to do. 
Fourth, limiting the special master’s role decreases the possibility of
scientific biases affecting her decision and preserves judicial autonomy in 
deciding purely legal questions, such as relevance.
Pursuant to FRCP 53(f), the parties would retain an opportunity to 
challenge the special master’s conclusions. In short, the scientist–special
master would offer a professional assessment of the scientific validity of
the proffered evidence, which the judge could then filter through a judicial
lens and afford each party the opportunity to object to the report’s 
recommendations.184 The judge would either accept the special master’s
report and recommendation as to reliability or reject it. The judge would 
make an independent ruling in the same way Daubert determinations are
made now, which preserves judicial autonomy.185 
The benefits of appointing a special master to preside over complex
Daubert hearings include more just results and the return of one of Frye’s
benefits. First, if the appointment of special masters in other contexts is
instructive, special masters are more likely to correctly interpret scientific 
and technical evidence, and appellate courts are less likely to overturn 
special masters’ determinations in “complex” cases.186 Using special
masters in Daubert hearings will advance the goal of accuracy in legal 
proceedings by increasing the likelihood the Daubert determinations are
correct. Moreover, appointing a special master who is educated in the 
proffered scientific field will have the welcome effect of bringing back
one of the main benefits of the Frye test: scientists judging science.187 
Relying on a scientist–special master also avoids Frye’s main
downside, the inflexibility of the test as it relates to novel scientific 
methodology.188 The Frye standard rejected novel scientific evidence 
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f)(1).
185. Id. 53(f)(3), (4).
186. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact
of Special Masters in Patent Cases (Federal Judicial Center 2009), available at
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/SpecMaPa.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M
VG-H78K]. “Complexity” in the study is based on the length of the trial. The 
study also found that when the trial was not “complex,” decisions involving
special masters and claim construction had relatively the same rate of reversal on
appeal as did those without special masters. In the Daubert context, the length of 
the trial likely means that the testimony is more complex, but the focus should be
on the complexity of the proffered scientific or technical testimony. Thus, overall 
trial length would not be the most appropriate metric for determining complexity
in the context of Daubert hearings individually. At the very least, the study shows
a correlation between longer trials and the relative correctness of special masters. 
187. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
188. Kesan, supra note 29, at 1990.
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872 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
when the underlying methodology had not yet met general acceptance in
the field,189 regardless of whether the methodology was scientifically 
valid.190 With a scientist–special master applying Daubert to determine
reliability, the scientist–special master could engage with the proffered 
evidence and determine on her own whether the methodology was 
scientifically valid. Under the scientist–special master solution and unlike 
under Frye, scientists would be able to judge science without
compromising the admissibility of valid evidence derived from novel 
scientific methodology because the individual scientist–special master 
could be more flexible than the aggregate opinion of the scientific 
community.191 Furthermore, judicial oversight of the special master
preserves the judicial function.192 
C. Lessons from Claim Construction
Patent infringement suits also require judges to make decisions that
involve scientific and technical knowledge.193 The claims of a patent
define the invention and determine the patent’s scope.194 Whether a patent 
has been infringed depends on the meaning of the words in the claims, and 
judges determine that meaning through claim construction.195 The 
Supreme Court gave judges the responsibility of interpreting patent claims
in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.196 
Scholars have heavily criticized Markman in part because judges may
not be capable of interpreting claims because of the claims’ complexity.197 
When engaging in claim construction, judges must give the words of the 
claim the meaning they would have to a person “of ordinary skill in the art 
189. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
193. Edmund Sease, Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably, U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 99, 99–100 (2004).
194. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 990 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“Anyone who wants to know what a patent protects
must first read its claims, for they are the measure of its scope.”).
195. Id. at 993; Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to 
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7–8 (2001). 
196. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1993) (holding 
that claim construction is an issue of law, so judges, not juries, must construe the
claims).
197. See Sease, supra note 193, at 99–101; Victoria Slind-Flor, Jurists Learn 
to Cope with the Brave New World, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 19, 1992) (suggesting that 
generalist judges sometimes cannot comprehend complex scientific issues).
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8732020] COMMENT
of the invention.”198 Few judges, however, are skilled in the art of the
invention before them.199 Judges often misinterpret the claims because of
a lack of technical knowledge and significant experience with patent
claims.200 One study showed that 33% of appealed claim constructions
were erroneously construed at trial,201 and estimates range as high as
50%.202 The high rate of reversals is due in part to the de novo standard of
review applied to claim construction in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.203 Anecdotal evidence also indicates that judges
may not be fully equipped to interpret patent claims.204 Markman put
judges in the uncomfortable position Daubert did, and judges responded
by appointing special masters to oversee claim construction.
Judges often appoint special masters in patent infringement litigation,
particularly to aid in claim construction, to fulfill the need for a decision-
maker with scientific or technical knowledge.205 Judges may not
understand the technical information needed to interpret the claim.206 
Parties’ experts’ testimony can complicate proceedings and make
decisions more difficult to properly render without preexisting technical 
knowledge.207 Thus, judges appoint special masters who understand the
technical aspects of the patent to interpret the claim because special
masters are more likely to come to the right decision efficiently.
A Federal Judicial Center study conducted by researchers Jay Kesan
and Gwendolyn Ball suggests that special masters are more likely than
198. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., 381 F.3d 1111,
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Federal Circuit is the exclusive court of appeal for
patent claims. Unless the Supreme Court takes up a case and renders a ruling, the
Federal Circuit’s decision applies nationwide.
199. Moore, supra note 195, at 7.
200. Id. at 11–16.
201. Id. at 13.
202. Donna M. Gitter, Should the United States Designate Specialist Patent
Trial Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English
Experience and the Work of Professor Moore, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
169, 170 (2009).
203. Id. at 179. Incidentally, the de novo standard also makes empirical
analysis of how often trial judges incorrectly construct the claims relatively easy, 
in contrast to the abuse of discretion standard applied in Daubert appeals.
204. See Honorable William G. Young, High Technology Law in the Twenty-
First Century, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 13 (1997) (panel of judges
discussing difficulties they have had with patent cases).
205. Neil A. Smith, Complex Patent Suits: The Use of Special Masters for
Claim Construction, 2 LANDSLIDE 36, 38 (2009).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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874 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
trial judges to construe claims correctly in complex trials.208 The 
researchers compared appeals in patent cases where special masters were
not appointed to appeals in which special masters were appointed.209 In
“non-complex” cases—with “complex” defined as lasting over 1,000 
days—cases with special masters had nearly the same rate of appeal and
rate of reversal.210 In “complex” cases, however, the rate of appealed cases
that had appointed special masters is roughly half of those without special
masters.211 Moreover, the researchers found that the reversal rate in 
“complex” patent cases without special masters was 11.7%, while in cases
with special masters the reversal rate was only 3.6%.212 These statistics
suggest that parties are less likely to appeal cases in which special masters
are appointed, which promotes judicial efficiency. Additionally, the 
statistics suggest that special masters’ findings are less likely to be
overruled, meaning the findings are more likely to be correct.213 Judges
should draw on the lessons learned from patent law and appoint special
masters to make Daubert determinations when the underlying case
involves complex, difficult, scientific, or technical issues.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS TO SPECIAL MASTERS IN DAUBERT HEARINGS
Two primary drawbacks exist to using special masters in Daubert
hearings: the increased cost to litigants and expert bias. The first, increased
cost to litigants, is common to legal reforms but can be alleviated with 
familiar tools. The second, expert bias, seems to be germane to expert
testimony as a whole, but the procedural guarantees of FRCP 53 can help
reduce biases.
A. Special Masters Increase Costs
Although special masters are the best existing procedural solution to 
the Daubert problem, special masters could be expensive for litigants.214 
208. Kesan & Ball, supra note 186, at 10.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 11.
212. Id. 
213. Id. (“These results would suggest that the average case with a special
master is both less likely to have a ruling appealed and less likely to have a ruling 
reversed than the ‘average’ complex patent case.”).
214. See Bedouin Joseph, The Louisiana Special Masters Statute, A Valuable
Tool or an Expensive and Unnecessary Diversion, 51 LA. B.J. 261 (2003)
(suggesting that special masters may lead to increased monetary costs to litigants).
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8752020] COMMENT
Under FRCP 53 and the special master solution, the litigants would
assume the cost of the special master.215 Scientist–special masters would 
likely charge their rates as expert witnesses, and these rates could lead to 
high costs.216 The judge has discretion under FRCP 53 as to the allocation
of expenses; therefore, judges could institute a system that apportions cost 
according to time spent evaluating the expert testimony.
1. Time-Spent Allocation
Judges could allocate the costs of each special master proportional to
the amount of time the special master spends evaluating each party’s 
experts. For example, if the special master spends five hours evaluating 
the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony and ten hours evaluating the defendant’s,
the defendant would bear double the cost of the plaintiff or two-thirds of 
the overall cost of the special master. This time-spent allocation is fair 
because the special master has to spend more time judging the reliability
of the defendant’s expert’s testimony compared to the plaintiff’s.
Moreover, although increased use of special masters could result in an 
increased net cost of litigation, a Federal Judicial Center study suggests
that for individual cases, special masters may lower the cost of litigation.217 
Additionally, the same study found that in technically complex cases, all
of the judges surveyed found the special masters effective in helping each 
judge understand the issue at hand.218 Several judges also reported that in 
those cases, the special master saved the parties money, made the case
settle faster, or improved the efficiency of judicial resources.219 
The institution of a risk-reward based system and scheduling of 
Daubert hearings prior to the end of discovery would alleviate much 
increase in cost. For example, suppose the plaintiff retains a hydrologic
engineer to testify as an expert. The special master determines at the outset 
that the reliability of the evidence is questionable, and after conducting the 
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(2)(A).
216. See Joseph, supra note 214 (suggesting that special masters may lead to
increased monetary costs to litigants).
217. Thomas E. Willging et al., Special Masters’ Incidence and Activity: 
Report to the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Its 
Subcommittee on Special Masters (Federal Judicial Center 2000), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SpecMast.pdf/$file/SpecMast.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/5VXL-D9Z8]; Lynn Jokela & David Herr, Special Masters in State
Court Complex Litigation: An Available and Underused Case Management Tool,
31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1299, 1312 (2005).
218. Willging et al., supra note 217, at 55. 
219. Id. at 59.
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876 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
reliability prong of the Daubert analysis, recommends to the judge that the 
testimony be ruled inadmissible due to lack of reliability. The judge then 
accepts the special master’s report and recommendation and excludes the
expert. If the special master conducts the Daubert analysis before the close 
of discovery, the plaintiff will have time to find a new expert. Moreover, 
the plaintiff is spared the expense of the now-excluded expert’s written
report, and the defendant is spared the expense of having her expert 
evaluate that report and the expense of deposing the plaintiff’s expert.220 
The plaintiff will still pay for the “evaluation” of the now-excluded
expert testimony. The judge could monetarily penalize the offending party 
if she or the special master determines that the attorney proffering the 
expert acted frivolously. By penalizing the offending party, some of the
cost shifts away from the non-offending party. The decision to penalize a
party would be entirely within the judge’s discretion under FRCP 53(g).
Long term, penalties could reduce systemic costs because parties would
be wary to proffer experts whose reliability is questionable.221 
2. Equitable Allocation
The cost of litigation varies depending on perspective. For example, a
small firm or solo practitioner funding a toxic tort case will have a different
view of the increased cost of the special master than a large corporate 
defendant that views the suit as frivolous. The former litigant may view
the special master’s fee as prohibitively expensive because the fee is 
another line item she will have to pay for.222 The corporate defendant will
view the special master’s fee as another cost it must incur to defend a 
frivolous suit, which may have the adverse effect of forcing the corporate
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
221. This approach would also have the effect of decreasing the prevalence of
junk science in the courtroom because parties would not want to risk being hit
with a penalty. Findings from a 2001 RAND report suggest that parties respond 
readily to changing admissibility criteria. The authors interpreted data suggesting 
there was a decrease in the percentage of excluded challenged evidence after 1997 
to mean that “parties proposing evidence either did not propose or withdrew
evidence not meeting the new standards, or better tailored evidence to fit the new 
standards.” Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting 
Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, RAND INST.
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT xvii (2001). If the researchers’ proposition is correct, 
it follows that parties would also stop proffering faulty expert testimony if they 
knew the special master was likely to exclude. 
222. See generally, Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead:
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
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8772020] COMMENT
party to settle.223 There is, however, a way to appease these competing
interests.
The corporate defendant that believes it is facing a frivolous suit 
benefits from the judge’s discretion in allocating cost and the protection
from junk science that the scientist–special master confers. If the suit is
frivolous or vexatious, the judge could allocate a part of the defendant’s 
cost of the special master to the plaintiff. 
For the plaintiff, the cost of the special master may be considered 
another financial barrier to her suit. If the plaintiff’s suit is viable, 
however, then she should be able to find an expert whose testimony will 
be admissible. Thus, the plaintiff should welcome the scientist–special
master as a means of ensuring that her expert’s testimony reaches the 
courtroom, especially given that some commentators believe Daubert
weighs against plaintiffs’ experts’ admissibility.224 Moreover, if the
plaintiff’s suit is successful, the judge could order the defendant to pay the
cost of the special master’s assessment of the plaintiff’s expert at the
conclusion of the trial.225 The judge should wait until the conclusion of the
trial to order the allocation of the cost of the special master, but even if the 
judge does not, under FRCP 53(g)(3), the judge can amend an interim
allocation after the suit concludes.
3. Proportionality as Incentive to Play Nice
In addition to the two methods described above, litigants could look
toward the FRCP’s 2015 amendments to the discovery rules as a means to
reduce cost, and judges could look to the amendments for help in deciding 
how to allocate cost.226 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, the Advisory 
Committee intended the amendments to address concerns that “litigation
223. See generally, Suja A. Thomas, Frivolous Cases, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 633
(2010).
224. Edward Cheng & Albert Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 473 (2005) (“The 
resulting effects of Daubert have been decidedly pro-defendant. In the civil 
context, Daubert has empowered defendants to exclude certain types of scientific 
evidence, substantially improving their chances of summary judgment and 
thereby avoiding what are perceived to be unpredictable and often plaintiff-
friendly juries.”).
225. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g) (2018).
226. See generally, FED. R. CIV. P. TITLE V, Disclosure and Discovery and
Committee Notes on 2015 Amendments.
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878 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
ha[d] become too expensive, time-consuming, and contentious.”227 To
resolve the increased expense of litigation, the Advisory Committee 
reintroduced the idea of proportionality.228 Under the current version of
FRCP 26, a “matter” is discoverable if it is non-privileged and “relevant
to any party’s claim and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”229 To
weigh proportionality, the litigants and judge must consider “the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely 
benefit.”230 To enforce the requirement of proportionality, judges may,
“for good cause,” issue a protective order to protect a party from undue
burden or expense by allocating the expenses of the discovery to the party
requesting it.231 
Some of the proportionality factors are readily adaptable to the 
Daubert hearing context.232 First, the judge could consider the relevance
of the proffered testimony as it relates to resolving a contested material
fact. Of course, if the proffered testimony is not relevant, the judge must
exclude it under Daubert and FRE 401. That said, testimony could be 
relevant but relatively unimportant. For example, in a hypothetical toxic
tort case, an expert’s testimony regarding known rates of cancer after
exposure to a particular substance would be highly relevant and critically
important. In contrast, an expert’s testimony as to known rates of cancer
in the particular ethnic subgroup of which the plaintiff is a member would 
be less relevant and much less important, but likely still admissible.
Assuming the plaintiff offers the former expert and the defendant offers 
the latter, it may be appropriate to shift some of the cost of the special
master to the defendant, since the plaintiff had to proffer the more relevant 
and important expert testimony to counter that of the defendant. Thus,
litigants will be incentivized to proffer only relevant, important expert
testimony, which will reduce cost and improve efficiency.
Second, the judge should consider “the parties’ relative access to
relevant information.”233 For example, suppose that in the same
227. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2015) 4, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year
–end/2015year–endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q7B-2E66].
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8792020] COMMENT
hypothetical toxic tort case the plaintiff attempts to introduce testimony of 
a renowned oncologist regarding the effect of a particular cancer on the
body. Expert testimony is powerful, and parties will want to put experts 
on the stand to help convince the jurors to find in their favor. If the same 
evidence in the oncologist’s testimony could be elicited through other
means—for example, from the plaintiff’s treating physician, who may be 
less renowned and less expensive than calling the additional expert—this
situation favors shifting cost to the party proffering the renowned
oncologist. Parties are free to call as many experts as the parties see fit,
and highly credentialed experts may be more convincing to juries.234 If 
parties want to use this trial strategy, however, they must be prepared to
pay for it.235 
Finally, the judge should consider “whether the burden or expense of
the [proffered testimony] outweighs its likely benefit.”236 Consideration of
the burden or expense outweighing the benefit factor would allow the 
judge to allocate more cost to the party who proffers redundant, or
generally unhelpful, expert testimony. Parties concerned with strict 
application of the factor would be disinclined to proffer unhelpful
testimony, which would result in fewer experts, less cost, and more
efficiency.
The proportionality factors listed above could serve as guideposts for
judges determining how to allocate the cost of the special master.
Combined with the time-spent method and the equitable method described
above, the factors could serve as a starting point for a judge exercising her 
discretion under FRCP 53(g) to allocate the cost of the special master.
Moreover, strict application of the proportionality factors would improve 
efficiency and reduce cost because parties would proffer fewer experts.
B. Ensuring Neutrality of Special Masters
The more difficult drawback to the use of special masters in Daubert
hearings is the possible lack of neutrality, which is the same problem that 
court-appointed experts, informal advisors, and expert testimony in
general present.237 Accepting that any scientist–special master will come 
into a case with scientific biases that could affect her judgment, the 
question becomes how to counter special masters’ biases, or at the very
234. See generally, Douglas Hanna & Paul R. Ferreira, Expert Witness
Overview: A Common Sense Approach, 229 N.J. LAW. 11 (2004).
235. Id.
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
237. Crowley, supra note 124, at 947.
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880 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
least, reduce the effects.238 No one can depose, cross-examine, or call the
special master to testify, so it would be difficult to draw out any biases via
the adversarial method.239 By limiting the special master’s authority to the
reliability prong of the Daubert inquiry, the effects of any bias will be
limited.
The special master’s role, which is fundamentally different than that 
of the court-appointed expert and informal advisor, will effectively
counter any lack of neutrality.240 The special master’s role is more judicial
in nature, and the increased formalism required by the written, presumably
well-reasoned report and recommendation would decrease the possibility 
of expert biases clouding judgment and may help to get “better” scientists 
to assist in the courtroom.241 These “better” scientists may be less apt to 
be biased, and the fact that neither party retains them supports that
contention.242 The increased formalism of special masters is inherent in 
FRCP 53.243 The special master makes legal and factual findings, unlike 
court-appointed experts and informal advisors.244 Moreover, FRCP 53
specifically contemplates that the special master is more akin to a judge.245 
FRCP 53(b)(3) states that proposed special masters must file an affidavit 
disclosing whether there are any grounds for disqualification under 28
U.S.C. § 455,246 which is the standard for disqualification for judges,
justices, and magistrate judges.247 Presumably, a scientist–special master,
upon realizing the job’s importance, would be more likely to avoid 
personal scientific biases when making Daubert determinations.
Additionally, the parties and the judge could work together to prevent 
biases. Under FRCP 53(b)(1), the parties may suggest candidates to serve
as the special master.248 The suggestion provision in the Rule would reduce
the odds of inherent scientific biases entering the courtroom because the
judge could force the parties to agree on a special master. Additionally,
the judge could screen for biases before appointing the special master.
Moreover, because FRCP 53(e) requires the special master to make a
report and recommendation to the judge, the judge could also screen for 
238. Id.
239. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 190–214.
241. Jackson, supra note 146.
242. Michael Risch, (Un)reasonable Royalties, 98 B.U.L. REV. 187, 258 (2018).
243. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
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8812020] COMMENT
biases after receiving the report and recommendation.249 FRCP 53(f)(1)
gives the parties an opportunity to object, be heard, and present evidence
that relates to the special master’s report and recommendation.250 Through
party interaction, any party could attempt to bring any biases to light.
Although there is a chance a special master would not be a completely
neutral decision-maker, special masters are the best of the three proposed
options because court-appointed experts and informal advisors come with
equal propensity to be biased and fewer procedures to check these
biases.251 A biased informal advisor is troubling because the parties cannot
check the informal advisor’s opinions, and the informal advisor may
communicate ex parte with the judge.252 Parties do not have the ability to 
cross-examine, depose, or call informal advisors to testify as they do with
court-appointed experts.253 On the other hand, parties receive a report and
recommendation from a special master that can be challenged if the parties
believe the special master made the wrong decision.254 Adding to the lack 
of party interaction with informal advisors is that the informal advisor’s
opinions do not have to be submitted to the parties in the form of a
report.255 The insulation from the adversarial process allows informal
advisors to avoid thorough examination of their opinions by the parties.256 
Informal advisors avoid individual accountability because they are
restricted to acting as the judge’s “sounding board,” so any of the informal
advisors’ biases would flow through the judge and be rendered judicial.257 
Informal advisors are also less efficient because they teach the judge the 
relevant science, as compared to the scientist–special masters who apply 
knowledge they already possess.
Court-appointed experts avoid some of informal advisors’ drawbacks 
with lack of neutrality because their opinions are subject to the full rigor
of the adversarial process under FRE 706.258 But subjecting court-
appointed experts’ opinions to the adversarial process causes problems 
that reduce the efficiency of court-appointed experts.259 First, the court-
appointed expert lacks the finality of the special master because the court-
249. Id. 53(e).
250. Id. 53(f)(1).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 129–135 and 151–157.
252. Hess, supra note 140, at 558.
253. FED. R. EVID. 706.
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(f)(1).
255. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1988).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 151–157.
257. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 158.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 129–135.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 129–135.
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appointed expert is simply another witness.260 Relatedly, being another
witness exacerbates the battle-of-the-experts concern, and court-appointed 
experts may unfairly bias the jury.261 The special master avoids these
problems and guards against them. The special master cannot exacerbate 
the battle-of-the-expert issue because special masters cannot be called as
witnesses.262 Additionally, the special master may encourage parties and
expert witnesses to behave properly because the special master is readily
able to identify questionable methodology in testimony. Moreover, if the
special master is only used to determine the reliability prong of the
Daubert analysis, the special master cannot bias the jury because Daubert
hearings are held outside of the jury’s presence.263 In short, special masters
may not be the perfect solution to scientifically complex Daubert
determinations, but special masters are the best existing solution.
CONCLUSION
Courts should utilize special masters in Daubert hearings because the 
procedural safeguards in FRCP 53 make special masters a better option
than court-appointed experts or informal advisors. Either courts should 
relax their interpretations of FRCP 53, or states should consider legislation 
to allow for more special master appointments. Although in patent cases
judges usually appoint patent attorneys to act as special masters,264 
scientists are better suited for the role in Daubert hearings. There may be 
other, not yet suggested, individuals who are well-suited for the task. A 
dearth of empirical research considers special masters in Daubert
hearings, so further empirical studies are necessary to better ascertain the 
proposed solution’s efficacy. Finally, because using special masters is not
a perfect solution, and technical and scientific evidence is only likely to
become more complex, scholars should continue to search outside of
260. See supra text accompanying notes 129–135.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 129–135.
262. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
263. Brandon L. Boxler, Judicial Gatekeeping and the Seventh Amendment:
How Daubert Infringes on the Constitutional Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 14 RICH.
J.L. & PUB. INT. 479, 492–94 (2011) (discussing how Daubert hearings may
prevent a jury from ever hearing the case because they are pretrial hearings that 
can be outcome-determinative).
264. Thomas L. Creel & Thomas McGahren, Use of Special Masters in Patent 
Litigation: A Special Master’s Perspective, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 109 (1998).
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existing solutions to try to alleviate the issues inherent with generalist
judges making scientific determinations.265 
265. See, e.g., Edward Di Lello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal 
for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1993); Ryan 
Seidemann et al., Closing the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness Testimony: A
Proposal to Institute Expert Review Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29 (2005).
